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DEFINING "GREEN":
TOWARD REGULATION
OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING CLAIMS
Roger D. Wynne*
Americans are awakening environmentally. They are
becoming increasingly aware of how they as a uniquely
overconsumptive people affect the physical world around
them.1 As this awareness builds, Americans are readily
considering themselves environmentalists. A 1988 survey
found that more Americans described themselves as environ-
mentalists than as either Republicans or Democrats.2 A year
later, a Gallup Poll reported that an overwhelming 76% of
Americans consider themselves environmentalists.3  But
calling oneself an environmentalist is not enough for many
Americans. They are seeking ways to improve their environ-
ment, to minimize their impact on it, or at least to assuage
their guilt over past and present sins.
This awareness and desire to act have given rise to a
phenomenon known as "green consumerism."' Environ-
mentally conscious shoppers seek products that pose fewer
* Contributing Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume
25, 1992. B.A., Yale University, 1988; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, and
M.S., University of Michigan School of Natural Resources, expected 1993. The author
would like to thank L. Bob Gilbertson for planting the idea's seed, Esther Bartfeld
and Julie Vergeront for fostering and encouraging its growth, and Raymond DeYoung,
James Krier, Terrance Sandalow, and the author's editors and colleagues at the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform for providing muchneeded pruning.
The author takes full responsibility for the final plant, weeds included.
1. See, e.g., ABT ASSOCS., INC., EPA CONTRACT NO. 68-D9-0169, ASSESSING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSUMER MARKET 1-4 (1990) [hereinafter ABT ASSOCS.]; U.S. EPA,
PUB. NO. EPA 530-SW-89-066, PROMOTING SOURCE REDUCTION AND RECYCLABILITY
IN THE MARKETPLACE: A STUDY OF CONSUMER AND INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO
PROMOTION OF SOURCE REDUCED, RECYCLED, AND RECYCLABLE PRODUCTS AND
PACKAGING 39-40 (1989) [hereinafter EPA, PROMOTING SOURCE REDUCTION AND
RECYCLABILITY].
2. DemoMemo, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, May 1988, at 58 (reporting the results of
a survey conducted by Alert Publishing, Inc.). The survey found that 39% of those
surveyed described themselves as environmentalists, while only 20% described
themselves as Republicans and 31% as Democrats. Id.
3. Schwartz, Earth Day Today, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Apr. 1990, at 40-41 (citing
the GALLUP REPORT, June 1989).
4. The growing wave of green consumerism is discussed in Koenenn, To Market,
to Market-With a Mission, L.A. Times, Mar. 15, 1990, at El, col. 2.; Going for the
Green: Taking Stock of the Green Consumer Movement, ENVTL. ACTION, Nov./Dec.
1990, at 19-23 [hereinafter Going for the Green].
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threats to the environment. They want goods and packaging
that use fewer resources and less energy to produce, whose
production generates less pollution, and whose disposal will
not contaminate the environment or aggravate the nation's
landfill crisis.5 By purchasing such products, they can feel
that they are doing the right thing, usually without reducing
the rate of consumption to which they are accustomed.
Manufacturers and advertisers are rapidly heeding the
call of the green consumer through a strategy best described
as "green marketing."' Hundreds of products-representing
more than nine percent of all new products introduced in
the U.S. in the first half of 1990 alone-have poured into
American markets in the past year emblazoned with some
sort of label or claim directed at environmental concerns.7
As a result, green marketing terms such as "environmen-
tally friendly," "recyclable," and "biodegradable" are becom-
ing household words. In the opinion of some marketing
5. For a popular explanation of the philosophy of green consumerism, see J.
ELKINGTON, J. HAILES, & J. MAKOWER, THE GREEN CONSUMER 5-11 (1990). For a list
of other books on green consumerism, see ABT ASSOCS., supra note 1, at 21-22.
The landfill crisis is addressed in OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, PUB. NO. OTA-O-424, FACING AMERICA'S TRASH: WHAT NEXT FOR
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE? 271-75 (1989) [hereinafter OTA] (reporting the EPA's
estimate that over 80% of the landfills operating in America in 1988 will close within
the next 20 years).
6. See, e.g., Lublin, States Make "Green" Marketing Tough Sell, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 24, 1990, at 11, col. 1. The same strategy also is referred to as "environmental
marketing," see Lawrence & Colford, Green Guidelines Are the Next Step, ADVERTIS-
ING AGE, Jan. 29, 1991, at 28, "environmental labeling," see Schorsch, It's Not Easy
Being Green: Can Our Economy Come Clean?, COUNCIL ON ECON. PRIORITIES RES.
REP., Apr. 1990, at 1, 3, or "green labeling," see Meier, It's Green and Growing Fast,
But Is It Good for the Earth?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1990, at 48, col. 4. Although the
phenomenon of green consumerism has become a force in American markets only
recently, the concept is by no means new. See, e.g., Henion, Ecological Marketing:
Will the Normative Become Descriptive?, in CONSUMERISM: SEARCH FOR THE CON-
SUMER INTEREST 280 (D. Aaker & G. Day 4th ed. 1982) (reprinting an essay published
originally in 1979); Kinnear & Taylor, The Effect of Ecological Concern on Brand
Perceptions, 10 J. MARKETING RES. 191 (1973).
7. Going for the Green, supra note 4, at 19-20 (citing statistics from Marketing
Intelligence Service, Inc.). Such products promise to garner increasing shares of the
U.S. marketplace; only one-half of one percent of all new products introduced in
American markets in 1985 carried a green marketing claim. Id. at 20; see also THE
GREEN REPORT: FINDINGS AND PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE
ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING 4-5 (1990) (authored by the attorneys general of ten
states and available from the Minnesota Attorney General's Office) [hereinafter THE
GREEN REPORT] (discussing other indicia of the growing green consumer market).
For specific examples of green-marketed products, see ABT ASSOCS., supra note 1,
at 5-18; 1991 New Green Products and Companies, BUZZWORM, Nov./Dec. 1991, at 41.
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commentators, green marketing has attained the status of
a "revolution."'
Without doubt, many companies have made sincere attempts
to minimize their products' environmental impacts.9 Many
have found innovative ways to use recycled materials in their
products. 10 Some manufacturers have begun to reduce excess
packaging by redesigning containers and concentrating their
products. 1' Others minimize their environmental impact
simply by making products that are durable, reusable, repair-
able, and recyclable. 2 Retailers, too, attempt to meet the
interests of increasingly environmentally conscious customers.13
Unfortunately, many companies pursue the "green" of
increased revenue more eagerly than the "green" of a healthier
environment. Such firms change their labels but little else.
For them, the response to green consumerism "is not to
market a new product or an innovation (the Japanese do that),
but to be first with a [marketing] distinction." 4  They
exaggerate or even fabricate the environmental qualities of
their goods, letting their advertising rhetoric far outstrip their
environmental contributions.
15
8. See Special Issue: The Green Marketing Revolution, ADVERTISING AGE,
Jan. 29, 1991.
9. See, e.g., SEVENTH GENERATION, ENVIRONMENTAL PRODUCT GUIDE (Spring
1990) (a mail order catalogue offering products touted as less environmentally
damaging) (available from Seventh Generation, Colchester, Vt.). See generally P.
CARSON & J. MOULDEN, GREEN IS GOLD: BUSINESS TALKING TO BUSINESS ABOUT THE
ENVIRONMENTAL REVOLUTION (1991) (a how-to guide for businesses wishing to "green"
both their products and their images). But see Frankel, The Trouble with Green
Products, BUZZWORM, Nov./Dec. 1991, at 37 (arguing that larger, more powerful
companies simply sell "greened-up" products and unfairly hinder the efforts of
smaller, independent suppliers of truly "deep-green" products).
10. See, e.g., EPA, PROMOTING SOURCE REDUCTION AND RECYCLABILITY, supra
note 1, at 32 ("Generally speaking, the quality of products containing recycled
materials has been vastly improved in the last twenty years.").
11. See, e.g., Schiller, P&G Tries Hauling Itself Out of America's Trash Heap,
BUS. WK., Apr. 23, 1990, at 101 (describing the efforts of Proctor & Gamble).
12. Hayes, Feeling Green About "Green," ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 29, 1991, at 46.
13. See, e.g., Fisher, Tending Wal-Mart's Green Policy, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 29,
1991, at 20; Thayer, 10 Rules for Selling "Green" Products, PROGRESSIVE GROCER,
Aug. 1990, at 117.
14. Chase, The Green Rush: Slowdown on Environmental Ties, ADVERTISING
AGE, May 28, 1990, at 25.
15. See Garfield, Beware: Green Overkill, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 29, 1991, at 26,
26 (lamenting that most "declarations of environmental righteousness [have] become
a gimmick, a fad or a cynical device for exploiting the consumer"); Holusha, Coming
Clean on Products: Ecological Claims Faulted, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1991, at D1,
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Left awash in this wave of green marketing are the increas-
ing numbers of consumers who want to make "environmentally
correct" purchasing decisions. 6 Yet because many of the
terms companies use to make green marketing claims have no
fixed meaning, labels featuring them provide consumers with
little genuine information. 7 Consequently, consumers have
scant help in distinguishing truly "green" products from those
simply claiming to be "green."
This Note joins a rising chorus calling for government
regulation of green marketing claims.'" It attempts to
encourage and add a sense of urgency to a burgeoning regula-
tory movement 9 by highlighting some of the legal issues that
such regulation entails. Part I identifies a gap in the law: the
inability of current truth-in-advertising laws to clarify the
legality of green marketing claims. Part II urges bridging that
gap quickly; it examines the costs of continued nonregulation
and describes some of the forms regulation is taking. Part III
attempts to allay any fears that such regulations might be
challenged on first amendment grounds. Part IV distinguishes
the goals toward which green marketing regulations should
strive from those that motivate so-called environmental seal
of approval programs.
col. 1 (stating that "many... companies are making changes in their packaging more
on the basis of marketing studies than environmental findings"); Slaba, When US
Corporations Go "Green"--Watch Out, Christian Science Monitor, May 18, 1990, at
19, col. 1 (asserting that "corporate marketing of the environment may be out-
stripping the deep-level commitment needed to alter the very way of doing business
that created runaway environmental pollution in the first place"); see also Letto,
Madison Avenue Goes Green, BUZZWORM, Sept./Oct. 1991, at 30; Selling Green,
CONSUMER REPORTS, Oct. 1991, at 687.
16. For evidence of the expanding green consumer market, see ABT ASSOCS.,
supra note 1.
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-88-208,
DEGRADABLE PLASTICS: STANDARDS, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 15-16 (1988)
[hereinafter GAO]; Lautenberg, Pulling the 'Green' Over Our Eyes, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 22, 1991, at A17, col. 1; EPA, PROMOTING SOURCE REDUCTION AND RECYCLABILI-
TY, supra note 1, at 5; THE GREEN REPORT II: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE
ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING 1-4 (1991) (available from the Minnesota Attorney
General's Office) [hereinafter THE GREEN REPORT II].
19. For examples of legislation and regulations that have been enacted or are
under consideration, see infra Part II.B.
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I. EXISTING STATUTORY FRAMEWORK:
THE LIMITS OF A GENERIC STANDARD
A. The Federal Trade Commission Act
The Federal Trade Commission Act2' (FTC Act), the primary
instrument of consumer protection at the federal level, evolved
from an antitrust statute. Congress passed the FTC Act in
191421 to augment the Sherman 22 and Clayton Antitrust
Acts.2 ' The law created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and, in section 5, authorized the FTC to halt "unfair methods
of competition."24  In 1938, Congress amended section 5 to
direct the FTC to prevent "unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce."2' Noting the importance of this amendment,
the Third Circuit stated that the FTC could "now center its
attention on the direct protection of the consumer where for-
merly it could protect him only indirectly through the pro-
tection of the competitor."26 Congress also amended section
12 of the FTC Act in 1938 to explicitly proscribe deceiving
consumers through false advertising.27
The FTC Act contains no definition of "deceptive," leaving to
the FTC itself the task of developing an interpretation of this
standard on a case-by-case basis. Although the scope of this
term and the vigor with which it has been enforced since 1938
has vacillated somewhat with the nation's changing political
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1988).
21. Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-77 (1988)).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
23. Id. §§ 12-27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 412 (1988); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 381-383, 386-390 (1988). For a brief overview of the historical background of the
FTC Act, see P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 59-60 (4th ed. 1988).
24. Pub. L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988)); see also Annotation, What Constitutes "False Advertising"
of Food Products or Cosmetics Within §§ 5 and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 50 A.L.R. FED. 16, 25 (1980).
25. Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 5, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988)).
26. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941).
The Supreme Court eventually lauded this development as "a significant amendment
showing Congress' concern for consumers as well as for competitors." FTC v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 384 (1965).
27. Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 12, 52 Stat. 111, 114 (1938) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 52 (1988)).
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climate,28 the malleability of "deceptive" became particularly
controversial during the Reagan administration. In In re
Cliffdale Associates, Inc. ,29 the FTC reined in the long-
standing view that an advertisement is deceptive whenever it
has a "capacity or tendency"" to deceive even "the ignorant,
the unthinking and the credulous."31 The commission nar-
rowed this definition of "deceptive" by introducing two
pertinent requirements: 1) the representation must be likely
to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circum-
stances; and 2) the representation must be "material," i.e.,
likely to affect consumers' choices." Although this new
standard engendered a flurry of comment and criticism,33 it
has been reaffirmed in subsequent FTC decisions and upheld
in federal courts.34
A generic standard like "deceptive" poses both advantages
and disadvantages as a check upon advertising. The FTC Act
and the state consumer protection laws that emulate it 35 are
28. See Schechter, The Death of the Gullible Consumer: Towards a More Sensible
Definition of Deception at the FTC, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 571, 574-76 (1989) (offering
an overview of the vicissitudes of the law of deception).
29. 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
30. FTC v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 151-52 (1942); see also Simeon Manage-
ment Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 n.ll (9th Cir. 1978); Goodman v. FTC, 244
F.2d 584, 602 (9th Cir. 1957).
31. Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942); see also Standard Oil Co.
v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 1978) (recognizing the standard but refusing to
apply it to a "patently absurd interpretation" of an advertisement); FTC v. Cinderella
Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
32. Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. at 164-65.
33. The two FTC commissioners who dissented in Cliffdale Associates provided
the most pointed criticism of the standard. See Bailey & Pertschuk, The Law of
Deception: The Past as Prologue, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 849 (1984) (authored by the
dissenters). For some other assessments, see Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive
Advertising, 65 B.U.L. REV. 657 (1985); Karns, The Federal Trade Commission's
Evolving Deception Policy, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 399 (1988); Schechter, supra note 28;
Shafer, Developing Rational Standards for an Advertising Substantiation Policy, 55
U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1986).
34. See, e.g., In re Figgie Int'l, Inc., 107 F.T.C. 313, 373-74 (1986); In re South-
west Sunsites, Inc., 105 F.T.C. 7, 147 (1985), affd, 785 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 828 (1986); In re International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1055-
57 (1984); In re Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 788 (1984), affd, 791 F.2d 189
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987).
35. Many state truth-in-advertising laws are closely patterned after the FTC Act.
See, e.g., Matanuska Maid, Inc. v. State, 620 P.2d 182, 185 (Alaska 1980) (finding
that Alaska's law, ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471, is "substantially similar" to the FTC
Act); Hageman v. Twin City Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 681 F. Supp. 303, 305 (M.D.N.C.
1988) (stating that North Carolina's law, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1988), was
"reproduced verbatim from the [FTC] Act'" (quoting ITCO Corp. v. Michelin Tire
Corp., 722 F.2d 42, 48 (4th Cir. 1983)), and was adopted "'to parallel and
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"useful for attacking a wide range of deceptive practices
precisely because [such laws] are so general and can be adapted
to address a broad range of conduct."" Unfortunately,
generic standards often fail to draw a discernable line between
permissible and illegal practices in particular circumstances.
Such is the case with most green marketing practices, where
"one person's deception is another person's clever marketing
scheme.""
B. The Deceptiveness of Green Marketing Claims
One can easily argue that many green marketing claims are
deceptive, even under the narrower Cliffdale" standard.
Recent surveys have concluded that consumers' choices are
materially affected by their concern over environmental issues,
and that consumers are increasingly attracted to products and
packaging that they believe minimize environmental im-
pacts. 9 Ninety-six percent of the consumers questioned in
one study reported that environmental factors play a very
important role in their purchasing decisions.4" According to
another report, eighty-two percent of those surveyed said they
have changed their purchasing decisions based on concerns
supplement'" it (quoting Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400
(1981))); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-626(a) comment 1 (1983) (stating that the law is
modeled after the FTC Act).
Many states simply adopt the FTC's standard of "deceptive" as their own. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1522(B) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b(b)
(1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(c) (1984). For a discussion of the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, see 17 AM. JUR. 2D Consumer and Borrower Protection
§ 282, at 217.
Although this Note focuses on the need for reform at the federal level, the analysis
applies to any statutory scheme that attempts to use generic standards to regulate
green marketing practices.
36. Letter from Julie A. Vergeront, Special Assistant Attorney General, Minne-
sota Attorney General's Office, Consumer Division, to Roger D. Wynne 1 (Oct. 11,
1990) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
37. Id.
38. In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
39. See generally ABT ASSOCS., supra note 1, at A-1 to A-4 (discussing recent
consumer and public opinion polls); Dagnoli, Green Buys Taking Root, ADVERTISING
AGE, Sept. 3. 1990, at 27 (describing the findings of an environmental marketing
survey).
40. WARWICK BAKER & FIORE, INC., How CONCERNED ARE CONSUMERS OVER
FACTORS AFFECTING THE ENVIRONMENT? 6 (1990).
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about the environment.4 Consumers are even willing to pay
more for these products. Seventy-eight percent said they
would pay five percent more for a product sold in "environ-
mentally-sound" packaging, while forty-seven percent were
willing to pay as much as fifteen percent more for such a
product.42
Manufacturers often describe the environmental benefits of
their products in the vaguest of terms: "environmentally
responsible," "ozone friendly," "non-polluting," and even
"lighter environmental formula."43 Despite their ambiguity,
these claims imply that they are based upon objective scientific
investigation. Frequently, however, manufacturers have no
reasonable factual bases for making vague, broad claims about
a product's environmental "friendliness" or "responsibility,"
because such attributes are highly subjective. No absolute
measure of "friendliness" exists; there are only varying degrees
of impact, most of which cannot be measured or compared
objectively. As long as one consumes anything, one is affecting
the environment. If manufacturers cannot substantiate their
apparently scientific claims, the FTC could find them guilty of
deception."
Because they play upon a matter of heightened public
interest and concern, vague green marketing claims should
come under particularly intense scrutiny for deceptiveness.
Such was the finding of the FTC and the Ninth Circuit in
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC.45 The FTC took Standard Oil to
task for television commercials the company ran in 1970. The
advertisements promoted a gasoline additive that helped
reduce the amount of visible emissions ("particulates") from
41. Gerstman + Meyers Inc., News Release 1 (New York City, July 1990).
42. Id. at 3, 5.
43. For lists and discussions of some popular, vague, green marketing terms, see
WARWICK BAKER & FIORE, INC., supra note 40, at 6-9; Smith, Environmentalists,
State Officers See Red as Firms Rush to Market "Green" Products, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 13, 1990, at B1, col. 3.
44. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 741 F.2d 1146, 1150-53 (9th Cir. 1984)
(sustaining an FTC ruling that a claim was unsubstantiated by factual evidence),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); see also Grady & Feinman, Advertising and the
FTC: How Much Can You "Puff" Until You're Legally Out of Breath?, 36 ADMIN. L.
REV. 399, 407-09 (1984) (discussing a line of cases in which the FTC found unsub-
stantiated claims deceptive); Preston, The Federal Trade Commission's Identification
of Implications as Constituting Deceptive Advertising, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1259-
70 (1989) (examining cases where the FTC required substantiation of claims that
imply that they are based upon proof).
45. 577 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1978).
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car exhausts, calling it a "major breakthrough to help solve
one of today's critical problems."46 The ads failed to point out
that particulate matter is a minimal part of automotive
emissions and that the additive had little effect upon more
troublesome, invisible emissions." The Ninth Circuit upheld
the FTC's decision to enjoin the ads, in part because they
played upon consumers' increased desire to do something
about air pollution:
[C]ommercial messages might lead the average viewer, in
his anxiety to help solve the pollution problem, to overre-
act even though upon careful reflection he might see for
himself the limitations inherent in the advertiser's
claim.... [I]t is appropriate for the [FTC] to consider this
factor in determining whether the advertising is mislead-
ing or deceptive.48
A truly reasonable consumer might realize the deceptive
nature of vague green marketing claims and be more skeptical
of them. Yet many consumers, in their concern to be more
environmentally responsible,49 will be easily induced to
choose a product bearing such a claim over an otherwise
indistinguishable product without one.5° In fact, most reason-
able consumers do not fully understand technical environmen-
tal phrases and are therefore relatively more attracted by
vague green marketing claims than by ones describing specific
environmental attributes.5'
46. Id. at 657-58, 664. The commercials appeared as many Americans were first
awakening to some of the environmental issues facing their nation and the globe.
The same year witnessed, among other events, the first Earth Day, see Schwartz,
supra note 3, at 40, and the enactment of the first comprehensive Clean Air Act
amendments, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(1970) (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7614 (1988)). Likewise,
the emergence of current green marketing tactics coincides with the recent
reawakening of American environmental consciousness. 1990, for example, saw the
twentieth anniversary celebration of Earth Day, see Schwartz, supra note 3, at 40,
and major revisions to the Clean Air Act, see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). For historical perspectives on the American environmental movement
between the two Earth Days, see Carpenter, Living with Our Legacy, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Apr. 23, 1990, at 60; Fessler, A Quarter-Century of Activism Erected a
Bulwark of Laws, CONG. Q., Jan. 20, 1990, at 153.
47. Standard Oil, 577 F.2d at 657-59.
48. Id. at 659.
49. For evidence of this concern, see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Lawrence, Mobil, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 29, 1991, at 12 (discussing
Hefty's loss of market share to degradable trash bags).
51. WARWICK BAKER & FIORE, INC., supra note 40, at 6-7, 12.
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Like vague green marketing terms, specific ones also can be
misleading. Terms such as "recycled," "recyclable," and
"degradable" are likely to mislead even the most reasonable
consumer in two ways. First, these claims can paint an
unclear or false picture of the product's physical composition
and its likely effect on the environment. Second, green
marketing terms state or imply that the physical characteris-
tics they purport to describe are somehow "good" for the
environment when, in fact, they often provide dubious benefits.
The term "recycled" frequently fails to describe accurately a
product's physical composition. Saying that a product is
recycled does not mean that it has been made entirely from
materials that have been used before.52 Some paper stock,
for example, is marketed as "recycled" when it contains only
a fraction of recycled material.53 Moreover, "recycled" is used
loosely. Most people visualize recycled paper as being made
entirely of postconsumer waste-the product of home or office
paper that would otherwise have been thrown away. Instead,
consumers often receive preconsumer waste, or mill
broke-scraps from the papermaking process that manufac-
turers have traditionally reused.54  Use of preconsumer
material certainly minimizes waste and is therefore ecologi-
cally desirable, but to label mill broke paper "recycled" is like
labeling baked goods "recycled" because bakers, instead of
disposing of pieces of dough scrap, mix them back into the
existing dough stock. Use of preconsumer waste is at best an
internal recycling process that does not involve the consumer.
Consumers who expect that they are buying products com-
posed of the materials that they placed into a recycling
program are therefore gravely misled by preconsumer recycled
products.55
52. For example, government regulations consider certain paper products
recycled when the products contain minimum percentages of recycled material. See,
e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 250.21(2) & table 1 (1990); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6,
§ 368.4(a)(2) & table 1(2) (1990).
53. See, e.g. 40 C.F.R. § 250.21 (table 1) (recycled facial tissue may have as little
as five percent postconsumer recovered materials).
54. See Davis & Kinsella, Recycled Paper: Exploding the Myths, GARBAGE,
May/June 1990, at 48, 49-50; Smith, Paper Chase, CONSERVATION 90, Nov. 23, 1990,
at 3, 4-5; THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 7, at 18-19.
55. This is not to say that manufacturers should not identify goods that contain
preconsumer waste. They should simply not do so by using "recycled" standing alone.
See THE GREEN REPORT I, supra note 18, at 8-10 (recommending use of the term
.reprocessed [or recovered] industrial material").
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"Recyclable" is also a problematic term. The fact that a
product is capable of being recycled does not make it likely
that the product will be recycled. Although Americans recycle
paper and paperboard products, glass, aluminum, and other
nonferrous metals, they only recycle a fraction of what they
use.56  Furthermore, many technical and economic con-
straints impede both the expansion of existing recycling
programs and the creation of new programs for potentially
recyclable materials, such as plastics, tires, and used oil. 7
A manufacturer that labels as "recyclable" a product for which
prohibitively few recycling programs exist may therefore
mislead consumers by giving them more hope than reality.
Commenting on a polystyrene cup emblazoned with the term
"recyclable," one critic noted, "There's no 'able' in saying
polystyrene is 'recyclable' since the absence of a polystyrene
recycling infrastructure means that few consumers have the
'ability' to recycle these plastics." S
"Degradability" is a particularly elusive and confusing
concept. Although no established standard exists,5 9 one
might consider a material to have degraded when it has
broken down into a chemical or structural form that is no
longer recognizable as the original.6 ° With this definition,
56. The EPA estimates that, as a percentage (by weight) of each material
generated in municipal solid waste, 25.6% of paper and paperboard products, 12.0%
of glass, 31.7% of aluminum, and 65.1% of other nonferrous metals were separated
from the waste stream for recycling in 1988. U.S. EPA, PUB. NO. EPA 530-SW-90-
042, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 UPDATE 11 (1990)
[hereinafter EPA, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE]. The high rate of recycling in the last
category is attributable primarily to the recovery of lead from batteries. See id. at
19; see also NATIONAL SOLID WASTES MANAGEMENT ASS'N, SPECIAL REPORT:
RECYCLING IN THE STATES (1990) (available from NSWMA, Washington, D.C.)
(discussing the status of state legislative initiatives on recycling).
57. For a detailed discussion of the complex issues facing specific, individual
recycling markets, see OTA, supra note 5, at 135-90. See generally id. at 194-202
(discussing barriers to increased recycling generally).
58. Wirka, "It's Not That Easy Being Green": Statement of Environmental
Action Foundation for the State Attorneys General Environmental Claims Task Force
Public Forum on Environmental Marketing 3 (Mar. 14, 1990); see also Holusha, A
Setback for Polystyrene, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1990, at 14, col. 1 (describing the
uneasy future of the small polystyrene recycling industry); Holusha, Drink-Box
Makers Fighting Back, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1990, at 33, col. 3 (discussing the debate
over the recyclability claims made by the manufacturers of aseptic packages, known
more commonly as "drink boxes").
59. OTA, supra note 5, at 182.
60. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 335 (1989) [hereinafter
WEBSTER'S] (degradable: "capable of being chemically degraded"; degrade: "to reduce
the complexity of(a chemical compound)"; degraded: "characterized by degeneration
of structure or function").
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almost every material-including radioactive waste-is
"degradable" under the proper conditions.61 "Degradable" is
actually a catch-all phrase encompassing specific types of
degradation. Biodegradation occurs when living microorgan-
isms (primarily bacteria and fungi) assimilate or consume
material. 2  Photodegradation results from exposure to the
ultraviolet portion of the spectrum of sun light (the same
portion that causes sunburn).63
Some makers of plastic products and packaging tout their
wares as "degradable."' Polymers-long, stable chains of
hydrocarbon molecules-account for the extremely useful
qualities of plastics, among them lightness, durability, and
strength.65 By modifying the composition of certain plastics,
manufacturers can make them more susceptible to
photodegradation.66  Such modifications allow ultraviolet
radiation to help break the long polymer chains, sever the
bonds between them, and greatly weaken the plastic.67
Cornstarch additives provide another means by which plastics
are rendered degradable.68 In long polymer chains, starch is
susceptible to photodegradation and biodegradation.69 Yet
only the starch additives degrade;7" the synthetic polymers
61. See, e.g., Wald, Wider Peril Found in Nuclear Waste from Bomb Making, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 28, 1991, § 1, at 1, col. 3 ("[Mluch of the radioactive materials in the
special storage tanks naturally degrade into harmless minerals over about 300
years . . ").
62. SOCIETY OF THE PLASTIC INDUS., INC., AN SPI OVERVIEW OF DEGRADABLE
PLASTICS 4 (1987) (presented at the SPI Symposium on Degradable Plastics,
Washington, D.C., June 10, 1987) [hereinafter SPI OVERVIEW]; OTA, supra note 5, at
180-81.
63. SPI OVERVIEW, supra note 62, at 4; OTA, supra note 5, at 181-82.
64. These products are clearly in the minority, as "degradable" plastics account
for less than one percent of the plastics market. See Schorsch, supra note 6, at 1.
Plastics manufacturers are not the only ones marketing their products as degradable.
For example, many makers of paper products such as paper grocery bags also label
their goods "degradable" or "biodegradable." See, e.g., Collection of paper bags (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Yet these claims also are
misleading because conditions in modern sanitary landfills minimize degradation of
all products-plastic, paper, or otherwise. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying
text.
65. SPI OVERVIEW, supra note 62, at 4; GAO, supra note 18, 8.
66. SPI OVERVIEW, supra note 62, at 4; OTA, supra note 5, 181-82.
67. SPI OVERVIEW, supra note 62, at 4; GAO, supra note 18, at 10.
68. SPI OVERVIEW, supra note 62, at 6; OTA, supra note 5, at 181.
69. SPI OVERVIEW, supra note 62, at 3-4.
70. See New Study Challenges "Biodegradable" Claims, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1991,
at C4, col. 5 (discussing L. Krupp, The Biodegradability of Modified Plastic Films in
Controlled Biological Environments (Jan. 1991) (unpublished master's thesis,
Department of Agricultural Engineering, Cornell University)).
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that make up the majority of corn starch plastics are almost
exclusively nonbiodegradable.71
Even if a reasonable consumer could decipher and under-
stand the physical concept of a "degradable" plastic product,
she would most likely overlook the fact that the product is
unlikely to degrade in the landfill in which it probably will be
entombed.72  Modern sanitary landfill design eliminates
conditions conducive to both photo- and biodegradation.73
Because new additions to these landfills are usually covered
daily with a layer of soil,74 light simply does not reach most
municipal waste, and photodegradation is unlikely to occur.
Once a landfill is closed, a final cover, usually of compacted
soil, is placed over it specifically to reduce the amount of
moisture reaching the waste, thereby minimizing the amount
of harmful substances contaminating groundwater through a
process known as leaching. 7 The resultant lack of moisture
limits the amount of biodegradation in the landfill.76 Most
modern landfills are so effective at limiting biodegradation
that landfill archaeologists have uncovered clearly biodegrad-
able products (such as ears of corn and newspapers) almost
fully preserved after decades of burial.77
Even if plastic products were to degrade as promised, the
environmental benefits from their degradation could be
negligible or, even worse, harmful.78 Of all municipal solid
waste discarded in the United States, plastics comprise only
about nine percent by weight and twenty percent by volume.79
Degradable plastics won't disappear. A recent study found
71. SPI OVERVIEW, supra note 62, at 4; GAO, supra note 18, at 10-11. To
maintain their desired strength, most synthetic/natural polymer blends can contain
no more than six to ten percent natural polymers. Id. at 11.
72. Seventy-three percent (by weight) of municipal solid waste was disposed of
in landfills in 1988, the latest year for which data is available. The remaining waste
was either burned, recycled, or composted. EPA, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE, supra
note 56, at 55 (table 26). For a general discussion of decomposition in landfills, see
OTA, supra note 5, at 275-76.
73. For a discussion of modern landfill design, see OTA, supra note 5, at 276-84.
74. J. CRAWFORD & P. SMITH, LANDFILL TECHNOLOGY 49-50 (1985); OTA, supra
note 5, at 281.
75. See Hoeks & Ryhiner, Surface Capping with Natural Liners, in SANITARY
LANDFILLING 311-22 (1989) (describing final covering); J. CRAWFORD & P. SMITH,
supra note 74, at 86-113 (describing control measures of landfill leachate pollution).
Leaching is analogous to water percolating through coffee grounds.
76. See OTA, supra note 5, at 275.
77. See OTA, supra note 5, at 275; Rathje, Rubbish!, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec.
1989, at 99, 102.
78. See OTA, supra note 5, at 182-83.
79. EPA, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE, supra note 56, at 19-20, 27 (fig. 9), 86.
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that they will not decompose into their natural, component
elements, but, at best, may break into smaller pieces of
plastic.8 ° Although such break-up may reduce the overall
space occupied by plastic products in a landfill, it will have no
discernable effect upon our landfill capacity crisis; "decomposi-
tion rates [even] of organic materials in landfills are so slow
that [decomposition's] space-saving benefits may not be
important."81 Furthermore, as "degradable" plastics break
up, they might release toxic substances, such as cadmium,
that are used to add color to the product.8 2 Additives like
cornstarch may "contaminate" otherwise potentially recyclable
plastics." Some critics argue that consumers will be more
likely to litter "degradable" plastics, erroneously thinking that
such products will simply disappear.8 4
On June 12, 1.990, seven state attorneys general brought
individual suits against Mobil Corporation, charging it with
making false and deceptive claims on its Hefty "degradable"
plastic bag line. 5 The box in which these bags were sold
carried the following claims:
* New Hefty Degradable Bags contain a special ingredient
that promotes their breakdown after exposure to elements
like sun, wind and rain.
80. New Study Challenges "Biodegradable" Claims, supra note 70, at C4, col. 5
(describing a study at Cornell University).
81. OTA, supra note 5, at 275 (emphasis removed).
82. R. DENISON & J. WIRKA, DEGRADABLE PLASTICS: THE WRONG ANSWER TO THE
RIGHT QUESTION 5-6 (1989) (available from the Environmental Defense Fund,
Washington, D.C.); Glenn, Degradables Tested in Compost Programs, BIOCYCLE,
Oct. 1989, at 28, 29. In this regard, non-degradable plastics may be more "environ-
mentally friendly," because they are basically inert when placed in a landfill and
probably do not release significant amounts of soluble by-products that could
contaminate groundwater through leaching. See R. DENISON & J. WIRKA, supra, at
5-6; OTA, supra note 5, at 276. Scientific uncertainty shrouds our understanding of
the toxicity and other environmental effects of the end products of degradable
plastics. See GAO, supra note 18, at 18; Glenn, supra.
83. R. DENISON & J. WIRKA, supra note 82, at 4-5; THE GREEN REPORT, supra
note 7, at 17.
84. [Plaintiffs] Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of the Verified
Petition and Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 25, State v. Mobil Chem. Co.,
No. 43152/90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York County) (Aug. 3, 1990) [hereinafter N.Y. Reply
Memo]; R. DENISON & J. WIRKA, supra note 82, at 3; OTA, supra note 5, at 180.
Mobil itself made this argument before it began marketing its degradable Hefty bag
line. MOBIL, PLASTICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT [2] (undated) (photo. reprint on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
85. The states that brought these suits were California, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. 7 States Accuse Mobil on
Plastic, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1990, at D24, col. 6.
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* This ingredient promotes degradation without harming
the environment.
* Once the elements have triggered the process, these
bags will continue to breakdown [sic] into harmless
particles even after they are buried in a landfill.
• Hefty Degradable Bags-A step in our commitment to a
better environment .... Hefty Helps!8"
Mobil also used visual imagery to enhance its environmental
claim. The front of the package featured an evergreen tree with
an eagle bathed in streaming sunlight. The back contained a
full trash bag and another tree, also awash in sunlight.8 7
Invoking state laws similar to the FTC Act, the attorneys
general pressed arguments like those discussed above in an
attempt to enjoin Mobil's green marketing tactic.88 In addi-
tion, many accused Mobil of making its claims without suffi-
cient scientific evidence 9 and with the full knowledge and
purpose that their box would materially affect consumers'
choices.9"
86. Complaint at 2-3, State v. Mobil Chem. Co., No. C5-90-6843 (Minn. Dist. Ct.,
Ramsey County) (June 12, 1990) [hereinafter Minn. Complaint]; see also Lawrence,
supra note 50, at 12, 13 (photograph).
87. Minn. Complaint, supra note 86, at 3; see also Lawrence, supra note 50, at 13.
88. Mobil actually announced in March 1990 that it would cease producing the
boxes in question. Holusha, Mobil Ends Environmental Claim, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30,
1990, at Dl, col. 3. The attorneys general persisted in an effort to make Mobil's
pledge legally binding, to recover past damages, and to prevent Mobil from using its
considerable existing stock of the boxes. See, e.g., [Plaintiffs] Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Temporary Injunction at 14-18, State v. Mobil Chem. Co., Inc.,
No. 90CV2408 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County) (June 20, 1990).
Texas settled its suit against Mobil on June 26, 1990, with Mobil agreeing to
discontinue making environmental claims on its plastic bag line after it depleted its
existing supply of the boxes. See Letter of Agreement at 2, 3, State v. Mobil Oil
Corp., No. 90-06906 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Dallas County) (June 26, 1990) [hereinafter Tex.
Letter of Agreement]. The remaining six states reached similar settlements with
Mobil almost exactly one year later. See, e.g., Stipulated Settlement Order, State v.
Mobil Chem. Co., No. C5-90-6843 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey County June 26, 1991);
Stipulated Settlement Order, State v. Mobil Chem. Co., No. 90-2-11787-1 (Wash.
Super. Ct., King County June 26, 1991); see also Sullivan, Mobil Settles Suit over
Claims Made for Its Hefty Bags, Wall St. J., June 28, 1991, at A4, col. 4.
89. E.g., Minn. Complaint, supra note 86, at 10; N.Y. Reply Memo, supra note
84, at 12-13; Complaint for Injunctive and Additional Relief Under the Consumer
Protection Act at 4, State v. Mobil Chem. Co., No. 90-2-11787-1 (Wash. Super. Ct.,
King County) (June 12, 1990); [Plaintiffs] Brief in Support of Motion for Temporary
Injunction at 27-33, State v. Mobil Chem. Co., Inc., No. 90CV2408 (Wis. Cir. Ct.,
Dane County) (July 16, 1990) [hereinafter Wis. Brief in Support].
90. E.g., Minn. Complaint, supra note 86, at 3, 6-10; N.Y. Reply Memo, supra
note 84, at 4-11; Plaintiff's Original Petition at 3-5, State v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
No. 90-06906 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Dallas County) (June 12, 1990).
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C. The Imprecision of a Generic Standard
Even though certain green marketing claims may be highly
deceptive, a generic "deceptive" standard nevertheless fails to
delineate them clearly from valid claims. Because no law is
tailored specifically to environmental terms, manufacturers
are left without clear guidance as to the legality of their
advertising, while law enforcement officials are left with an
unwieldy weapon with which to prosecute potential transgres-
sors. The imprecision of the generic standard is compounded
by several considerations, all of which suggest that green
marketing claims may not truly be legally "deceptive."
Stretching the truth is commonplace in advertising.
Manufacturers may not need to substantiate factually91 their
vague or broad green marketing terms (like "environmentally
friendly") if such claims are mere "puffery." Puffery is "an
expression of opinion not made as a representation of fact"92
or a claim that is "either vague or highly subjective"9 3-the
essence of a term like "environmentally friendly." Consumers
might view claims such as "lighter environmental formula"
skeptically, just as they do claims that a product is "healthy."
Simply put, truly reasonable consumers might not be deceived
because they will know not to take vague green marketing
claims literally.94
More specific green marketing terms may not deceive
reasonable consumers either. Should consumers be misled by
91. But see supra note 44 and accompanying text (arguing that manufacturers
need to substantiate their vague green marketing terms).
92. Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1945).
93. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 741 F.2d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1084 (1985). Prosser and Keeton define the term more bluntly in the
context ofjustifiable reliance: "The 'puffing' rule amounts to a seller's privilege to lie
his head off, so long as he says nothing specific .... " W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R.
KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 109, at 757 (5th ed.
1984). A useful description of "puffery" may be found in Preston, supra note 44, at
1300-06.
94. This, of course, asserts a negative answer to what would be the decisive
question in a puffery defense: whether the claim implies that it can be objectively
proven so that a reasonable consumer would take it seriously. If the claim appears
credible, the FTC may find that it is not mere puffery and that the advertiser must
substantiate it. E.g., In re National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 558 (1973)
(finding battery company's duration claims deceptive); see also Preston, supra note
44, at 1259-70 (discussing claims that imply that they are substantiated by proof and
that have been found deceptive under the FTC Act).
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a "recycled" product made purely from preconsumer waste95
when the federal government itself includes such waste in its
definition of "recycled material"? The EPA, in its guidelines
for federal procurement of products that contain recycled
material, states that such material may consist of "industrial
scrap ... and other items, all of which can be used in the
manufacture of new products."96 Furthermore, even though
the term "recycled" may not disclose the exact details of what
types of recycled materials a product contains or what
percentages, are consumers who want to minimize environ-
mental impacts misled when they purchase a product contain-
ing preconsumer waste instead of one that contains no
reprocessed waste of any kind? Indeed, consumers may be
properly led to demand products that help reduce the overall
waste stream, 97 which certainly are better for the envi-
ronment than products that contain no waste materials at
all.9 8
Likewise, should the term "recyclable" mislead the consumer
who reasonably considers the information imparted to her?
The suffix "-able" simply means that a product is "capable
of99 being recycled. The company does not actually claim
that the product will be recycled. That duty is left to others.
Even if no recycling infrastructure currently exists for that
material, such labeling might create a demand for necessary
95. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
difference between preconsumer and postconsumer wastes.
96. 40 C.F.R. § 247.101(g) (1990); see also id. § 246.101(w) (defining recycled
material as "material that is used in place of a primary, raw or virgin material in
manufacturing a product").
The EPA is far from clear in this regard, however. For example, in its guidelines
for federal procurement of paper and paper products containing recovered material
(which is functionally the same as "recycled material" in this context), it excludes
from its definition of such material that which is, in essence, preconsumer waste:
"materials and by-products generated from, and commonly reused within, an original
manufacturing process." Id. § 250.4(kk). Nevertheless, EPA goes on to explain that,
in the case of paper and paper products, "recovered material" may include what is
arguably preconsumer waste: "waste generated after completion of the papermaking
process ... [and] [f]inished paper and paperboard from obsolete inventories." Id.
§ 250.4(kk)(2)(i)-(ii).
97. The EPA's Recycling Advisory Council has recently adopted a definition of
"recycling" that focuses on waste-stream reduction and could accommodate
preconsumer wastes. See Food and Drug Administration Allows First Use of Recycled
Plastic for Soft Drink Containers, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1703 (Jan. 25, 1991).
98. This argument, however, discounts the value to consumers and the environ-
ment of being able to choose among recycled products containing different types and
amounts of waste materials.
99. WEBSTER'S, supra note 60, at 45 (emphasis added).
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recycling services. °0  When recycling infrastructures are
created, "recyclable" labels will enable consumers to identify
those products that can be consigned to them. Many states
have therefore passed laws requiring codes on plastic contain-
ers to identify the type of resin from which they are made so
that recycling industries can sort them readily.'0 '
Marketing a plastic product as "degradable" may not be
inherently misleading because degradable plastics provide
tangible benefits in many applications. Specialty plastics
allow physicians to employ biodegradable sutures, which the
body absorbs, in medical procedures. 10 2 Degradable plastic
mulching film, used for a variety of agricultural purposes,
could eliminate the cost of removing nondegradable film. 03
Six-packs of beverages are commonly bound together by plastic
"yokes." These yokes are frequently discarded as litter and
have proven deadly to animals, especially marine species, that
consume them or become entangled in them. 4 Numerous
states have mandated specifically that these yokes be made
from degradable plastics.
0 5
Even those degradable plastics destined for landfills may
provide benefits, at least in the eyes of many lawmakers.
Many state legislatures have endorsed degradable plastics.
0 6
100. Holusha, "Recyclable" Claims Are Debated, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1991, at Dl,
col. 3; Meier, States Seek to Control Environmental Claims, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1990,
at C5, col. 3.
101. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 403.708(9) (1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 1721-
1726 (Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-32-03 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3734.60 (Anderson Supp. 1990). These laws were passed without substantial plastic
recycling infrastructures in place. Cf. EPA, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE, supra note 56,
at 48 (stating that, with the exception of plastic soft drink bottles, recycling of plastic
containers after consumer use in the U.S. has been very slight thus far).
102. SPI OVERVIEW, supra note 62, at 3; see also Beiser & Kanat, Biodegradable
Internal Fixation, J. AM. PODIATRIC MED. A., Feb. 1990, at 72 (reviewing the
literature on, and describing the benefits of, biodegradable sutures and other means
of internal fixation in podiatric applications).
103. GAO, supra note 18, at 12-13.
104. For a discussion of the harmful effects of yokes and other plastic debris on
marine species, see Weisskopf, Plastic Reaps a Grim Harvest in the Oceans of the
World, SMITHSONIAN, Mar. 1988, at 58.
105. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.06.090(b) (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 339-22 (Supp.
1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.582 (West Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 13:1E-99.4 (West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 459.850(5) (1989); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 1525(a)(2) (1984 & Supp. 1991).
106. See, e.g., 1988 Minn. Laws c. 688, art. 17, § 1, subdivs. 3-4 (repealed 1990).
Legislators are not necessarily the arbiters of environmental truth. See, e.g., infra
notes 110-11 and accompanying text (illustrating confusion in the Minnesota
legislature over the issue of "degradable" plastics).
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Some require or authorize state agencies to use degradable
plastic products," 7 while others have enacted legislation
banning the sale of non-degradable plastic products through-
out the state. 10 8 In what appeared to be the most compelling
portion of its answer to the Minnesota Attorney General's
complaint against its degradable Hefty bag line, Mobil
pointed to a recently enacted Minnesota law that would have
forbidden any public agency-including the Attorney General's
office-from buying or using nondegradable plastic garbage
bags.1"9 Thus, some laws not only embrace the benefits of
degradable plastics, but also require the use of degradable
plastic products that consumers could not identify but for the
existence of the allegedly misleading term "degradable" on the
label.
II. A CALL FOR REFORM
When is a green marketing claim unlawful? How far can
manufacturers stretch the truth of vague terms like "environ-
mentally friendly" before they enter the realm of deceptive-
ness? How much postconsumer waste must a product contain
before it can honestly be called "recycled"? What exactly must
a discarded product become if it is to be labeled "degradable"?
In short, how green must a "green" product be?
107. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 7905 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991)
(requiring agency use of degradable or recyclable plastic products when available at
reasonable cost and in an appropriate quantity and quality); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-13.4-
4-6(g) (West 1991) (requiring agencies to use degradable products if certain conditions
are met); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2038(B) (West Supp. 1991) (requesting and
authorizing agency use of "degradable or recyclable plastic materials in those
instances when it is'appropriate and economically feasible").
108. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 403.708(10)(a) (1989) ("[No plastic bag shall be provided
at any retail outlet ... unless the bag is composed of material which is degradable
within 120 days .... "); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 34A-7-5.2 (Supp. 1991) ("No
plastic garbage bag or plastic garbage can liner may be offered for sale in this state
after July 1, 1995, if the bag or can liner is not constructed from starch-based plastic
or is not biodegradable, photodegradable or otherwise degradable.").
109. Answer at 2, State v. Mobil Chem. Co., No. C5-90-6843 (Minn. Dist. Ct.,
Ramsey County) (July 2, 1990) [hereinafter Mobil's Minn. Answer] (referring to 1988
Minn. Laws c. 688, art. 17, § 1, subdivs. 3-4 (repealed 1990)). Unfortunately for Mobil,
Minnesota repealed that law before it became effective, nearly two months before
Mobil filed its answer. See 1990 Minn. Laws c. 597, § 73 (signed May 3, 1990); 1990
Minn. Laws c. 604, art. 10, § 32 (signed May 7, 1990).
Green Marketing
804 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:3 & 4
Unfortunately, a generic "deceptive" standard fails to answer
such questions clearly. As a result, confusion is often the only
certainty within the current regulatory scheme. Even state
legislatures appear confused. For instance, Minnesota's
legislature, which had mandated that all state agencies use
degradable plastic garbage bags, repealed that law before it
took effect.11° It relied on a state committee's report that
revealed the dubious benefits of "degradable" plastics in
standard waste-disposal systems, raised concerns over the
safety of degraded end-products, and described the detrimental
effects that promoting degradable plastics could have on recy-
cling, consumer education, and litter reduction efforts."1
A ten-state task force of attorneys general (the "Task Force")
conducted a public forum on environmental marketing in St.
Paul, Minnesota in March of 1990 and concluded that all
parties involved in this issue-manufacturers, consumer and
environmental groups, legislators, and enforcement and
administrative officials-agree that the existing regulatory
framework is in need of reform.'12 In essence, the report
issued by the Task Force found that the costs of not regulating
are simply too great.'13
A. The Costs of Not Regulating
Without regulation, three costs will mount: manufacturers
will continue to make questionable environmental claims,
consumers will become disillusioned, and the consumer market
will fail to serve as a mechanism of genuine environmental
innovation and improvement. First, manufacturers will
continue to be tempted and pressured into making dubious
environmental claims. Given the choice between avoiding
110. 1990 Minn. Laws c. 597, § 73; 1990 Minn. Laws c. 604, art. 10, § 32 (both of
these sections repeal the earlier law).
111. THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 7, at 31 n.21.
112. See THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 7, at 15-16. The Task Force held
subsequent hearings the following December to solicit comments on the preliminary
report and presented its revised recommendations in a May 1991 report. See THE
GREEN REPORT II, supra note 18.
The GAO and EPA have made similar calls for reform in the fields of degradable
plastics and recyclability, respectively. See GAO, supra note 18, at 15-16; EPA,
PROMOTING SOURCE REDUCTION AND RECYCLABILITY, supra note 1, at 5, 35.
113. See THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 7, at 12-14.
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technical and legal uncertainty on the one hand and protecting
market share and increasing profits on the other, an increasing
number of manufacturers not surprisingly choose the latter.
114
The case of Mobil and its "degradable" Hefty bag line
provides an illustrative example." 5 Before Mobil had intro-
duced these products, it published a pamphlet entitled
"Plastics and the Environment," which attempted to dispel the
myth of degradable plastics and their alleged environmental
benefits. 6 It explained that bio- and photodegradation
cannot take place in landfills quickly enough to provide any
tangible benefits and that "[i]n fact, biodegradation may not
be desirable in landfills" because of leachate and other prob-
lems.1 v The pamphlet concluded that the solution to solid
waste management does not lie in degradable materials, but
in a combination of source reduction, recycling, incineration,
and landfilling. 11'
Nevertheless, Mobil introduced its "degradable" Hefty bag
line in 1989. The company felt pressured to promote a product
it knew to be of little or no value to landfill problems. Mobil
officials explained:
Mobil has concluded that biodegradable plastics will not
help solve the solid waste problem .... We do, however,
see that there are some short-term public relations gains
in switching to a photodegradable plastic ... bag ....
And it's that public relations value that has to be con-
sidered as opposed to real solutions to the problem. 9
114. See generally EPA, PROMOTING SOURCE REDUCTION AND RECYCLABILITY,
supra note 1, at 40-42 (noting that "[c]ertain industry leaders have recognized this
social trend and have declared that environmental ... concerns hold promising
opportunities for marketers").
One advertising firm encouraged manufacturers to concentrate more on public
relations than scientific fact, see WARWICK BAKER & FIORE, INC., supra note 40, at 10
("'[sihare of mind' has to do more with publicity than reality."), and to exploit
previously unexploited markets, see id. at 15 ("[N]o one company has yet established
itself as being environmentally aware in the minds of consumers. A large opportu-
nity exists for companies to be among the first to establish themselves in these
terms.").
For a discussion of the growth of green marketing tactics, see Going for the Green,
supra note 4, at 19-20.
115. The case is described from Mobil's point of view in Lawrence, supra note 50.
116. MOBIL, PLASTICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 84.
117. Id. at [2] (emphasis removed). For a discussion of leachate issues in landfills,
see OTA, supra note 5, at 276-81.
118. MOBIL, PLASTICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 84, at [4].
119. Lawrence, supra note 50, at 12 (quoting Robert Barrett, General Manager,
Mobil Solid Waste Management Solutions Group); see also Wis. Brief in Support,
supra note 89, at 25 (quoting same).
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We've got to be, you know, market driven. I guess that's
the easiest way to say it. You're not going to beat them,
so you better join them.120
As increasing numbers of manufacturers are pressured or
tempted to join the green marketing bandwagon, the second
major cost of nonregulation-consumer disillusionment-will
mount.'12  Questionable or misleading claims will certainly
come to light, rendering consumers less likely to believe other
green marketing claims-even valid ones-or to channel their
increasing environmental consciousness into purchasing
decisions. As an official in EPA's Office of Pollution Preven-
tion has explained: "'The fear is that if consumers get
consistently confused, they may get cynical and tune out, and
we will lose our chance to push environmental changes.' ,,22
The third cost of not regulating green marketing terms is
the logical economic outgrowth of the first two: failure of the
market to serve as a mechanism of genuine environmental
innovation and improvement. Ideally, enhanced environmen-
tal consciousness among consumers should create a demand
for less environmentally damaging products. Consumers could
use their purchasing power to reward firms that produce such
goods, thereby creating incentives for other firms to follow
suit. 123 The current regulatory framework, however, under-
mines this process. Consumers are clearly demanding
"greener" goods, but a dearth of reliable information prevents
them from directing their demand consistently toward
products that offer genuine environmental improvements.
Furthermore, manufacturers that produce truly less harmful
products are unable to reap the rewards of their innovations
120. Wis. Brief in Support, supra note 89, at 25 (quoting the trial transcript); see
also Posthearing Brief of Mobil Co. at 9-10, State v. Mobil Chem. Co., Inc., No.
90CV2408 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Dane County) (July 31, 1990) (expanding on the market
pressures to offer a degradable plastic bag); Lawrence, supra note 50, at 12-13
(explaining the rationale behind Mobil's decision to market a degradable plastic bag).
121. See THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 7, at 14.
122. Chute, No EPA "Green" Labels Planned, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Oct. 8, 1990,
at 1, 29 (quoting Sharon Stahl, the acting chief of the policy analysis branch of EPA's
Office of Pollution Prevention); see also Meier, supra note 6, at 48, col. 4 ("'The result
of all this is that people are going to assume that they can't do anything right ....
We are going to guilt-trip them into lethargy.'" (quoting Linda Lispen, a legislative
counsel for Consumers Union)).
123. For a brief discussion of the prospects for consumers to affect a 'greening"
of industrial and corporate America, see Hannum & Juniper, Shades of Green:
Consumer Shopping as If the Earth Counted, BUZZWORM, Jan/Feb. 1990, at 36.
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and investments. '24 Because green marketing terms tend to
be vague, broad, and oversimplified, manufacturers who offer
nothing more than meaningless, "feel good" sentiment are able
to make essentially the same claims as those who make
substantial investments in products and manufacturing
processes that limit environmental impacts.
B. The Forms of New Regulations
Various governmental bodies have taken steps toward
enacting and implementing legislation and regulations re-
garding green marketing claims. In September of 1990, the
California legislature approved the Environmental Advertising
Claims Act, which defines certain specific terms used to make
environmental claims and requires that manufacturers
substantiate vague ones. 2 ' One month later, Senator Frank
Lautenberg proposed the federal Environmental Marketing
Claims Act of 1990,126 a bill that he reintroduced as S. 615
during the following session of Congress.'27 The bill calls
upon the EPA (with the aid of an independent advisory board)
to define green marketing terms and to create a certification
program through which manufacturers must seek permission
to use them. 2 ' The New York State Department of Environ-
mental Conservation has defined "recyclable," "recycled," and
"reusable" and has promulgated regulations for an official
recycling emblem. 2 9 In November of 1990, the Northeast
124. See THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 7, at 14; Garfield, Lever Bros. Paints
Wisk a Suspicious Shade of Green, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 22, 1990, at 62.
125. 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1413 (West) (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 17508.5, 17580-17581 (West Supp. 1991)).
126. S. 3218, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S16019-22 (daily ed. Oct. 18,
1990).
127. S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S3034-39 (daily ed. Mar. 12,
1991). Representative Sikorski introduced the House companion bill, H.R. 1408.
102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. H1669, E898-99 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1991).
128. S. 615, supra note 127, § 6, 137 CONG. REC. S3036. The bill, as introduced,
places authority to promulgate regulations and grant certification solely in the EPA;
it does not mention the FTC. Section 5 of the bill describes the composition and
function of the independent advisory board. See S. 615, supra note 127, § 5, 137
CONG. REC. 83036.
129. N.Y. CoMp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, §§ 368.1-.6 (1990). These regulations
were issued under the authority of N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 27-0717(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1991).
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Recycling Council (NERC) adopted model labeling standards for
claims of reusability, recyclability, and recycled content.
130
The purpose of this Note is not necessarily to critique these
various initiatives, but to lend a sense of urgency and some
clarity to the efforts behind them. The preceding sections of
this Note attempted to instill a sense of urgency. In pursuit
of clarity, this section outlines the most common aspects of
these regulations.
1. Definitions and standards for specific terms-Relatively
specific green marketing terms can now be misused so readily
because no accepted definitions of them exist. Terms like
"recycled" possess degrees of truth; a "recycled" product may
contain 10% preconsumer waste, or 95% postconsumer
waste.131 Hence, the term "recycled" does not alone impart
sufficient information to shoppers.
Definitions attempt to link the words to some specific
environmental attribute of the product. Some definitions are
purely descriptive and read like dictionary text. California's
Environmental Advertising Claims Act, for example, defines
"biodegradable" as "the proven capability to decompose in the
most common environment where the material is disposed
within one year through natural biological processes into
nontoxic carbonaceous soil, water, or carbon dioxide."
132
Although it is unlikely that many consumers will become
familiar with the technical aspects of such definitions, the
definitions may prove invaluable in weeding out claims that
are "less true" than others.
Other definitions take the form of some minimum standard
that the product must attain before a manufacturer may apply
a given term. New York's detailed standards list the mini-
mum percentages of preconsumer and postconsumer materials
that certain products must contain before each can be labeled
130. Northeast Recycling Council Regional Labeling Standards (Nov. 27, 1990)
[hereinafter NERC Standards] (available from NERC, Brattleboro, Vt.). NERC is
comprised of officials and legislators representing Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Vermont. Memo from William Ferretti, Vice-Chair of NERC, to Members of
NERC and Other Interested Parties Regarding Regional Labeling Standards and
Labeling Resolution (Dec. 10, 1990).
131. For a discussion of preconsumer and postconsumer wastes, see supra notes
52-55 and accompanying text.
132. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(b) (West Supp. 1991). The Act also lists
definitions for "ozone friendly," "photodegradable," "recyclable," and "recycled." Id.
§ 17508.5(a), (c), (d), (e).
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"recycled."133 If standards are strict enough, some believe
manufacturers will develop innovations in product design and
composition to meet them.
134
Still other definitions require a reasonable possibility that
the advertised environmental benefit will actually be real-
ized.13 5 S. 615, which proposes a federal environmental
marketing claims act, would not allow manufacturers to use
certain terms, even though the terms may be technically true,
unless the attribute they describe has a realistic chance of
occurring. For example, a manufacturer could not describe a
product or package as "recyclable" or "compostable" without
proving that at least twenty-five percent of the product will be
recycled or composted.'36 Likewise, a manufacturer could
not label its product as "reusable" without showing that it is
actually reused for its original purpose an average of five
times or more. 137  New Jersey already has enacted a less
restrictive definition of "recyclable" for beverage containers,
stating that no beverage container may carry the term unless
the state "determines that a convenient and economically
feasible recycling system for that specific container is avail-
able. 138
2. Government preapproval or registration for use of defined
terms-To ensure compliance and reduce policing efforts,
regulations may require that manufacturers first demonstrate
to the government that they plan to use defined terms
properly. New York's elaborate recycling emblem program, for
example, prohibits manufacturers from using an official
recycling emblem without obtaining prior authorization from
133. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.4(a) (1990).
134. See Environmental Defense Fund, Comments on New York State Department
of Environmental Conservation Recycling Emblems Regulations 1-3 (Mar. 1990); see
also S. 615, supra note 127, § 2(b)(4), 137 CONG. REC. S3035 (stating that a purpose
of the Act is to 'encourage the development of innovative technologies and practices").
135. See generally THE GREEN REPORT II, supra note 18, at 18-27; THE GREEN
REPORT, supra note 7, at 38-42.
136. S. 615, supra note 127, §§ 6(b)(7)(B), (D), 137 CONG. REC. S3036. The bill
does not state if this recycling or composting rate would have to be achieved
nationwide, or if it is only a marketwide requirement. These sections would mandate
that after the year 2000 the minimum rate would increase to 50%. Id. Subsection
D further requires that the compostability of the product be a desirable attribute and
that no toxic materials be released from it. Id. § 6(b)(7)(D), 137 CONG. REC. S3036.
137. Id. § 6(b)(7)(C), 137 CONG. REC. S3036; see also NERC Standards, supra note
130, at 1.
138. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-99.18(a) (West Supp. 1991). This definition was
enacted as part of New Jersey's 1987 Mandatory Statewide Recycling Program Act.
See 1987 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 359, 367 (West).
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the state Department of Environmental Conservation." 9
Likewise, S. 615 would require a manufacturer wishing to use
a term defined under the Act to certify to the EPA that its
environmental marketing claim comports with the Act. 4 °
This type of regulation raises the issue of administrative
competence. Lawmakers considering legislation to authorize
such regulation should query the wisdom of placing full
enforcement power in the hands of an environmental agency.
S. 615, for example, specifically empowers only the EPA to
implement the Federal Environmental Marketing Claims Act;
it does not mention the FTC.' One should bear in mind
that green marketing, after all, consists of two components:
"green" (which relates to environmental impacts) and "market-
ing" (which relates to advertising). Although the EPA is
particularly well-suited to address the "green" component, it
may not be as adept at implementing the "marketing" compo-
nent. The FTC, on the other hand, with its Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection, is experienced at policing potentially
deceptive marketing practices. Legislators therefore should
consider means of explicitly drawing upon the collective
expertise of both agencies to implement green marketing
legislation at both the rulemaking and enforcement stages.'42
3. Disclosure and substantiation requirements-Some
regulations may require manufacturers using green marketing
terms to explain their claims affirmatively, or at least to be
prepared to substantiate them. Specific terms might still be
139. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.5(d) (1990).
140. S. 615, supra note 127, § 7(a), 137 CONG. REC. S3037. The EPA would be
allowed to disapprove the certification at any time. Id. § 7(b), 137 CONG. REC. S3037.
141. See S. 615, supra note 127.
142. The FTC has stressed the importance of close coordination between the FTC
and the EPA in this matter. Environmental Labeling of Consumer Products: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the [Senate] Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transp., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1990) (prepared statement of Barry Cutler,
Director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection). Although S. 615 does not
explicitly integrate the FTC into the regulatory scheme the bill would create, it does
not purport to diminish the FTC's existing authority either. See id. § 13(b), 137
CONG. REC. S3038. Indeed, the FTC is considering its own regulations even in the
absence of an express congressional mandate. See Industry, EPA, States Urge FTC
to Issue National Labeling Guidelines, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 646-47 (July 19, 1991)
(describing hearings held by FTC on this issue). Furthermore, the FTC, the EPA,
and the U.S. Office of Consumer Affairs "have joined to form a Federal Task Force
to provide a coordinated and cohesive national response to the issue of environmental
labeling and marketing claims." 56 Fed. Reg. 49,992, 49,993-94 (1991) (soliciting
'comment on options for guidance to be used by marketers in product labeling and
advertising promoting the use of recycled materials and recyclable materials").
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used for substandard products. S. 615, for example, would
allow a manufacturer to label its product "recycled," even if
the product did not conform to the standard definitions, as
long as it clearly listed the percentages of preconsumer and
postconsumer materials on the label.143 Other state regula-
tions on vague terms simply call for the manufacturer to be
prepared to back up its claims. For example, California
mandates that those who use broad green marketing terms
like "environmentally friendly" maintain information and
documentation supporting the validity of the claim and furnish
it to the public upon request.' 4
4
4. Prohibiting overly vague terms-Green marketing
regulation ultimately seeks to place useful information in the
hands of consumers so that the market may serve as an agent
of environmental improvement.145 Broad terms like "envi-
ronmentally responsible," therefore, possess little value;
standing alone, they are highly subjective, difficult to verify,
and tend to create the misleading impression that the product
poses no harm to the environment. 146  S. 615 may pave the
way to abolish such terms. It calls upon the EPA, in its role
as lexicographer, to "ensure that an environmental marketing
claim shall be related to a specific environmental impact or
attribute in such a manner as to ensure that [it] is not false,
misleading, or deceptive," and that it has been substantiated
scientifically.'47
5. A search for uniformity-For various bodies to promul-
gate different definitions and standards for green marketing
terms would severely undermine the goal of providing reliable
information. Varying definitions would confuse consumers
and, more critically, would leave manufacturers who sell their
products in different jurisdictions facing conflicting regula-
tions. Actions of large states such as California and New York
and regional efforts like NERC's may provide models for the
rest of the nation, but uniform, national standards are clearly
143. S. 615, supra note 127, § 6(b)(7)(A)(ii), 137 CONG. REC. S3036. NERC
suggests that all "recycled" emblems identify preconsumer and postconsumer
composition (by weight) of the product. NERC Standards, supra note 130, at 3.
144. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17580 (West Supp. 1991); see also THE GREEN
REPORT II, supra note 18, at 29-30; THE GREEN REPORT, supra note 7, at 44-45.
145. See Hannum & Juniper, supra note 123.
146. See THE GREEN REPORT II, supra note 18, at 5; THE GREEN REPORT, supra
note 7, at 31-33; supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
147. S. 615, supra note 127, § 6(b)(2)-(3), 137 CONG. REC. S3036 (emphasis added).
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needed. 4 ' S. 615 attempts to meet that need, even though
it would allow states to adopt standards more stringent than
federal ones.1
49
The search for uniformity raises an important question:
Who will be involved in setting these uniform standards? At
first blush, this appears to be a purely administrative func-
tion, because legislatures may not have the expertise to handle
the relevant technical issues. 150  But even if the process of
establishing standards is a technical function, it remains an
inherently political one as well. Manufacturers will engage in
line-drawing battles with environmentalists and consumer
advocates. 5' For example, should a paperboard product be
deemed "recycled" if it contains no less than 10% postconsumer
148. See, e.g., Holusha, "Recyclable" Claims Are Debated, supra note 100, at Dl,
col. 3; Lublin, supra note 6, at 11, col. 1. National standards have been anticipated
in various legal fora. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 (West Supp. 1991)
(allowing manufacturers to comply with definitions that may be established by the
FTC in lieu of state ones); Tex. Letter of Agreement, supra note 88, at 2 (allowing
Mobil to reinstate its "degradability" claim in its Hefty bag line if it complies with
any "uniform national standards" that might be promulgated).
149. S. 615, supra note 127, § 13(c), 137 CONG. REC. S3038. The bill also would
permit states to bring suit for violations of the federal regulations. Id. § 10, 137
CONG. REC. S3038. In suggesting that federal regulations not preempt more
stringent state ones, the bill's author may have been responding to the concerns of
the Attorneys General Environmental Marketing Task Force, which felt that states
should be allowed to protect their own citizens and environment through tougher
standards, should they see fit. See Letter from Hubert H. Humphrey, III, John K.
Van de Kamp, James M. Shannon, Robert Abrams, Jim Mattox, & Don J. Hanaway
to Sen. Lautenberg 9-10 (June 29, 1990), reprinted in THE GREEN REPORT, supra note
7, app. H.
This does not imply that the Task Force opposes federal legislation. Minnesota
State Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey, III, whose office spearheads the Task
Force, has stated: "'We must begin that process [of setting national definitions and
standards] now .... Without federal action, state and local lawmakers will have no
choice but to piece together their own solutions, as best they can.'" Lawrence &
Colford, supra note 6, at 28, 28-30.
150. But see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 (West Supp. 1991) (California
legislature itself defining certain terms). One might wonder how readily such
legislatively defined terms might be amended to comport with future innovations and
circumstances.
151. These groups have already clashed over this and related issues. See
Holusha, U.S. Guidelines Sought for Environmental Ads, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1991,
at C2, col. 5 (nat'l ed.) (stating that environmental groups are likely to oppose
guidelines on the use of terms like "recycled" and "recyclable" that a trade association
proposed to the FTC) (a shortened version of this article appeared as Holusha,
Industry Seeks U.S. Rules Covering Environmental Ads, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1991,
at D6, col. 2 (late ed.)); Holusha, Environmental Coalition Split, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4,
1991, at D2, col. 4 (describing why environmental and consumer groups withdrew
from the Source Reduction Council of the Coalition of Northeastern Governors).
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material,"5 2 or no less than 35% postconsumer material? 153
Purely "technical" answers to such questions do not exist.
Rather, these questions should be addressed in consultation
with those most likely to be affected by the answers. Law-
makers considering a standard-setting process, therefore, need
to consider carefully how to incorporate the various points of
view involved without turning the process into a free-for-all."5
III. GREEN MARKETING CLAIMS:
UNLIKELY CANDIDATES FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
Those who would oppose the regulation of green marketing
claims might challenge such proposals on constitutional
grounds, arguing that the regulations violate their first
amendment right to free speech. Mobil, for example, raised
first amendment defenses when several state attorneys
general attempted to enjoin its "degradable" claims on its Hefty
bag line. 55 Yet first amendment challenges, even to the most
restrictive regulations,' 6 probably would not get very far.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court had ruled that commercial
speech lay outside the reach of first amendment protection.
1 57
152. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(e) (West Supp. 1991).
153. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.4 (table 1(2)(v)) (1990).
154. The Lautenberg bill attempts to strike such a balance. S. 615, supra note
127 § 5, 137 CONG. REC. S3036 (creating an advisory board consisting of consumer
advocates and representatives from the business community, environmental organiza-
tions, state and local governments, and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, but placing final administrative power in the hands of EPA). The
operations of this board also will have to comport with the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1988) (creating standards and uniform
procedures to govern the establishment, operation, administration, and duration of
such bodies) and the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1988)
(amending and supplementing the Advisory Committee Act to mandate access to
advisory committee meetings).
155. See, e.g., Mobil's Minn. Answer, supra note 109, at 4; Answer and Affirmative
Defenses at 4, State v. Mobil Chem. Co., Inc., No. 90-2-11787-1 (Wash. Super. Ct.,
King County) (July 2, 1990); see also supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text
(discussing the state suits).
156. Regulating green marketing claims would certainly limit what manufacturers
and advertisers could say about their products. The extent of restrictions on this
speech would depend upon the regulatory approach employed. Banning certain terms
would restrict speech more than would establishing standardized definitions of terms.
Both of these approaches, in turn, would be more restrictive than requiring
manufacturers to substantiate their environmental claims.
157. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (sustaining a ban of a
handbill advertisement); see also Recent Development-Trends in First Amendment
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Yet in the last fifteen years, the Court has extended limited
protection to commercial speech, l"' the bounds of which have
been a topic of lively scholarly debate.159 Nevertheless,
throughout this period, the Court has maintained that
commercial speech does not warrant the same degree of
constitutional protection as most types of speech.16 °
Two Court decisions are particularly important to this issue.
The Court welcomed commercial free speech back into the fold
of constitutional protection in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.'61 In this deci-
sion, the Court professed a belief that the strong public
interest in the free flow of commercial information should not
be impinged upon blithely.162 In Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,1 3 the Court
described when government restrictions may be permissible.
To merit constitutional protection, the speech at issue must
"concern lawful activity and not be misleading."'64 A restric-
tion on such commercial speech, the Court continued, is valid
only if it directly furthers a substantial governmental interest
and is no more extensive than necessary to achieve that
interest. 1
6 5
Protection of Commercial Speech, 41 VAND. L. REV. 173, 176-79 (1988) (authored by
Mary Nutt).
158. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
560-66, 571 (1980) (striking a state commission's order that prevented utilities from
promoting the use of energy); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 363-64, 384 (1977)
(invalidating a rule that prohibited attorneys from advertising the price and
availability of legal services); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (striking a regulation that prevent-
ed pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs); see also Recent
Development, supra note 157, at 180-202.
159. See, e.g., Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1977);
Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Lively, The Supreme Court and Commercial
Speech: New Words with an Old Message, 72 MINN. L. REV. 289 (1987); Symposium:
Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1165 (1988)
(containing several articles); Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78
CALIF. L. REV. 359 (1990) (authored by David F. McGowan); Comment, First
Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine,
44 U. CHI. L. REV. 205 (1976) (authored by Thomas W. Merrill).
160. G. GUNTHER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 795 (4th ed. 1986).
161. 425 U.S. 748, 758-62 (1976).
162. Id. at 765 ("So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy,
the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in
the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.").
163. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
164. Id. at 566.
165. Id.
SPRING AND SUMMER 1991] Green Marketing
Well-crafted government regulations of green marketing
terms are likely to pass constitutional muster for four reasons.
First, such regulations will achieve the Virginia Pharmacy
goal of promoting well-informed decisions in the market-
place.'66 One could readily argue that keeping commercial
speech free from regulation enhances the flow of "information
and opinion about competing commercial products and services
[that] undoubtedly aid the individual in making countless
life-affecting decisions."'67 This reasoning, however, sup-
ports restrictions on commercial speech in the green marketing
context, where the information currently being imparted is
lost in ambiguity and possible deception. As one commentator
asserts, "[e]nforcement and regulatory actions, which are care-
fully crafted to insure the free flow of accurate commercial
information, are of vital importance to a free market sys-
tem." 6 ' Green marketing regulations are intended to
ensure such accuracy,'69 thereby enhancing the market's
ability to serve as a mechanism not only of individual benefit
to consumers and manufacturers, but also of environmental
improvement.
Second, claims that tend to be deceptive deserve less
constitutional protection in the face of compelling government
166. 425 U.S. at 765. Two critics have argued that this goal is anomalous in first
amendment jurisprudence because commercial advertising is irrelevant to the
traditional reasons for invoking freedom of speech: enhancing individual self-
fulfillment through free expression and contributing to political decision making in
a representative democracy. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 159, at 25. Indeed,
Virginia Pharmacy introduced an element of "economic liberty" into the first
amendment, harkening back to the now discredited doctrine of Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Jackson & Jeffries, supra 159, at 30-33; id. at 31 n.108
("Lochner has come to be regarded as the symbol of an era when the Court struck
down legislation solely because it interfered with economic liberty.").
Nevertheless, one should not be sidetracked by such criticisms. The goal of freeing
commercial information from restraints makes a certain degree of practical sense, if
not complete constitutional sense. See Pridgen & Preston, Enhancing the Flow of
Information in the Marketplace: From Caveat Emptor to Virginia Pharmacy and
Beyond at the Federal Trade Commission, 14 GA. L. REV. 635, 667-70 (1980) (arguing
for the enhancement of the flow of commercial information). More importantly, in
terms of defending the constitutionality of green marketing regulations, Virginia
Pharmacy is still valid law.
167. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 630 (1982).
168. McKenzie, Ambiguity, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 56 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1295, 1308 (1988) (emphasis added).
169. See, e.g., S. 615, supra note 127, § 2(b)(2), 137 CONG. REC. S3035 (stating that
one purpose of the proposed law is to "empower consumers with reliable and
consistent guidance to facilitate value comparisons with respect to environmental
marketing claims").
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interests than do nondeceptive ones. The Central Hudson17 °
Court determined that "the government may ban forms of
communication more likely to deceive the public than to
inform it."'7 ' In a later decision, Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court,72 the Court
asserted that the validity of a government's regulation of
commercial speech is enhanced "[w]hen the possibility of
deception is . . . self-evident."'73 Many potentially misleading
green marketing claims may be lawful under the FTC's
Cliffdale74 standard, which interprets the FTC Act to hold
unlawful only those material claims that are likely to mislead
reasonable consumers. 75  This does not necessarily mean
that such claims are immune from regulation, however; the
government can make a strong case that particular terms do
not clear the Court's "self-evident possibility of deception"
standard, 76 thereby weakening any pleas for first amend-
ment protection from definitions or prohibitions on the use of
such terms.
Third, the government can easily demonstrate substantial
interests in these regulations177 and show that the regulations
"directly advance[] the governmental interest[s] asserted."'
The government has long had an interest in protecting citizens
from potentially deceptive advertising in general. 179  More
specifically, the government has a valid interest in promoting
170. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
171. Id. at 563.
172. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
173. Id. at 652-53. Some critics have assailed this "self-evident" standard as too
vague a rationale by which to determine when commercial speech deserves protection.
See Schmidt & Bums, Proof or Consequences: False Advertising and the Doctrine of
Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1273, 1286 (1988).
174. In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
175. Id. at 164-65. For a discussion of the limitations of the FTC Act and the
Cliffdale standard in regulating green marketing claims, see supra Part I.
176. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652-53. To prove this case in the context of prohib-
iting the use of overly vague terms, the government would first have to counter
claims that such terms are mere "puffery." See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying
text.
177. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980) ("The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions
on commercial speech.").
178. Id. at 566.
179. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (describing the purpose of the
1938 amendments to the FTC Act).
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means to diminish adverse impacts on the environment.18 °
Regulated, truthful green marketing claims-ones related to
specific environmental attributes likely to be realized-further
this goal by allowing consumers to reward manufacturers that
produce less environmentally damaging goods.181
Finally, green marketing regulations are tailored specifically
to achieve the government's interests. The types of regula-
tions discussed above are not like those invalidated in Virginia
Pharmacy or Central Hudson. In Virginia Pharmacy, the
Court struck down a Virginia law that effectively forbade
pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription
drugs.8 2 The Court looked skeptically upon the state's
proffered justifications, "for on close inspection ... the State's
protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on...
their being kept in ignorance."1 3 The goals of green market-
ing regulation, on the contrary, rest on keeping citizens
informed. Definitions and standards will lend meaning to
otherwise ambiguous terms and will proscribe only those
terms that cannot be substantiated objectively.
Although banning particular terms may appear heavy-
handed, it does not approach the draconian measures invali-
dated in Central Hudson. There the Court struck down a
state commission's complete ban on advertising by an electric
utility to promote the use of electricity. 184  Although the
Court recognized the state's interest in energy conserva-
tion,185 it held that a ban on all promotional advertising was
overly broad.'86 By contrast, bans on particular green mar-
keting terms-ones that might mislead consumers and cannot
be defined with any precision-are tailored specifically to
achieve the government's interests in protecting consumers
and in helping the market serve as a mechanism of environ-
mental improvement. Manufacturers will still be able to
describe the environmental attributes of their products. They
will simply have to use specific, uniformly defined terms to do so.
180. See, e.g., the congressional declaration of purpose for the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988). But cf. Coase, supra note 159, at
5 (asserting that "regulation makes things worse or, at the best, makes very little
difference").
181. See Hannum & Juniper, supra note 123 (discussing how the green consumer
market might ideally serve as a mechanism for environmental improvement).
182. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749-52.
183. Id. at 769.
184. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558-61.
185. Id. at 568.
186. Id. at 569-71.
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IV. THE GOALS IN PERSPECTIVE:
DISTINGUISHING ENVIRONMENTAL SEALS OF APPROVAL
The goal of green marketing regulation is to put information
in the hands of consumers. Regulations will ensure that
information pertaining to the environmental attributes of
products and packaging is as specific, accurate, and truthful
as possible. With such information, consumers can act in
greater confidence that their decisions will have the promised
effect. Similarly, such information will enable manufacturers
to make the requisite investments in less environmentally
damaging products and processes with the assurance that
others will not be rewarded solely for slick advertising.
Is there danger, however, in too much information? Perhaps
government-established definitions of green marketing terms
will be too complex or technical for consumers to understand.
Maybe consumers should simply be told, by an entity that can
be trusted to weigh the technical and complex issues involved,
which products are less environmentally harmful than others.
In very rough terms, the quasi-governmental environmental
seal of approval programs in Germany, Canada, and Japan
attempt to do just this." 7 Private groups like Green Seal
and Green Cross would like to do the same in the United
States.' These groups would charge manufacturers a fee
for testing a product against a variety of criteria. Green Seal
would employ criteria that involve a "life-cycle" or "cradle-to-
grave" analysis of the product, factoring in how many resources
were used in its production, how much pollution was generated
and energy consumed in its production and use, and what is
likely to happen to it (whether it will be reused, recycled, or
discarded) once it has been used for its original purpose.8 9
187. For a discussion of labeling programs in these and other nations, see APPLIED
DECISION ANALYSIS, INC., ADA-89-2085, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELING IN THE UNITED
STATES-BACKGROUND RESEARCH, ISSUES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-18 (Draft 1989)
(available from Office of Pollution Prevention, EPA, Washington, D.C.).
188. See Freeman, Ecology Seals Vie for Approval, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 29,
1991, at 30 (mentioning also that the Hearst Corporation's Good Housekeeping is
considering developing its own environmental seal of approval). Other groups have
already developed environmental "ratings" scales. See Schorsch, supra note 6, at 5
(briefly describing the "Earthwise Standards for Environmental Evaluation of
Consumer Products" and "Ecoscale").
189. See Meier, Life-Cycle Studies: Imperfect Science, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1990,
at 29, col. 1 (taking a critical look at the "life-cycle" analysis approach). The EPA,
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Green Cross has begun using a much narrower set of criteria,
one that certifies the high recycled content of certain prod-
ucts. 19° Green Cross, however, also has decided to develop
its own "life-cycle" analysis program, one which could compete
with Green Seal's.191 Products meeting the respective test-
ing organization's criteria would be allowed to display its seal
of approval, directing environmentally conscious consumers
toward the product.
One should not confuse the goals behind the regulation of
green marketing claims, as discussed in this Note, with those
behind seal of approval programs. Regulation of green
marketing claims would attempt to put information in the
hands of consumers, even at the risk of overwhelming them
with too much information. Seals of approval, on the other
hand, would attempt to distill highly technical information
about value-laden issues into a relatively simple yes-or-no
decision. Subjectivity is at the core of many green consumer
choices. For example, is a good made from 100%
postconsumer material, which nevertheless employs toxic
bleaches and dyes in its production, less environmentally
damaging than a nonrecycled good whose production involves
no toxic byproducts? A seal of approval would help to make an
otherwise difficult choice easier, yet precise terms on a label
would allow consumers to exercise their own discretion,
weighing for themselves what environmental attributes of a
product are most desirable.
Regulation of environmental claims and seals of approval
are by no means incompatible,192 but seals of approval will
not obviate the need for effective regulation. Seal of approval
programs would place faith in centralized decision-makers,
while regulated green marketing terms would place ultimate
faith in individual, ecologically conscious consumers. Having
both seals of approval and regulated terms on a label might
give consumers some added flexibility; the seal could alert
while not proposing to institute its own seal of approval program, plans to research
methodology for making environmental "life-cycle" assessments. Chute, supra note
122, at 1.
190. Freeman, Eco-Approval: First Marketers Get Green Cross, ADVERTISING AGE,
Sept. 3, 1990, at 54.
191. Freeman, supra note 188, at 30.
192. See, e.g., S. 615, supra note 127, § 6(b)(2), 137 CONG. REC. S3036 (allowing
seal of approval programs to operate within the context of regulated green marketing
claims if the EPA "determines that such seals are awarded according to objective
criteria that promote environmentally preferable products and packages").
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them to a product that is somehow environmentally "good,"
while terms could help to explain why. Consumers could then
check their own intuitions against those of the seal-givers.
Yet having only seals would defeat the purpose of fostering
true environmental consciousness, because consumers would
make choices based purely upon a desire to do good, not upon
a working knowledge of what "good" implies. Unless people
become aware of the complex ecological implications of their
consumptive habits, green consumerism, as an agent of
environmental improvement, might be doomed to the status of
a superficial fad.
V. CONCLUSION
It is too easy to become cynical about the green consumer
movement. At one level, even its title is an oxymoron; the
more we consume, the more we affect the environment and the
less "green" we become. The greenest path, therefore, is to
consume less, not simply to consume the same amount
differently. Yet because this notion is anathema to American
marketing, and because altering manufacturing processes to
minimize environmental impacts is often very expensive, many
manufacturers have resorted to telling little green lies in the
hope of attracting green consumers. As these half-truths
proliferate, consumers will not know who to believe and may
even stop believing anyone. One can hardly blame consumers
for becoming disillusioned and cynical when everything from
french fry packages, to wooden pencils, to shaving cream is
marketed in some ecologically benign shade of green.
Nevertheless, we should resist this cynicism and preserve
the green consumer movement. No matter how much we
reduce our consumption, we always need to consume. When
we do, we make choices that entail different effects, both in
type and degree, on the environment we want to protect.
Green consumerism holds the promise of reducing these effects
marketwide by allowing consumers to demand products that
pose less environmental harm than others. We must therefore
prevent little green lies from derailing this movement. Only
by inhibiting the ability of manufacturers to stretch the truth
can we restore a degree of faith in a movement presently
threatened by misinformation, disillusionment, and cynicism.
Only when our choices are informed accurately and truthfully
can we hope to become a society of "greener" consumers.
